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III. 
STATEMENTS OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
.*.*.-.
 !
 <* ^n »r>pe.,. ->m an :.A.\. adicial 
District C*.ir*. i:-- :..,;;;=..* bounty, the Honorable Timotr:, 
Distribution Center' .'\ " ' lotion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against Def^nd^^ ^ r M --' Mills'1}, The case involved 
appeals t r. - 0 rder. 
-.-• invalid ;- i sid. The tax deed > ^;r~-^~ property }-
" - - *.- subject propert
 t < -aieteci ,n FDc =is- gainst ' ne 
Defendant ^  >** -erso^^ claiming Mnder fher ^ <TP" *i c 
tins appea 3 Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) n* ^li pursuant * :-:.,e 
? •' :i of the Utah Rules 01 Appelate Procedure. 
• 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The isstif - .* 
( ) ) ^ : . u e i i. n - ^ *r  t ;o i , r t erred in i t s 
irteroretation of the ]>t*\^ -refutes aoverri^a
 n o t i c e requirements 
I II1 S d 11. .i * • ; 
(?) w h e t h e r r* s^ -n t . t led to notice of the 
assessment of taxes and the final tax sale and, if so, whether 
the notice to FDC was constitutionally adequate. 
(3) whether the lower court committed error in 
granting summary judgment against the tax deed claimant in view 
of the existence of genuine issues of material facts. 
NOTE: The issues cannot be defined more precisely than 
above at this time inasmuch as there was no hearing on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. There are no findings of fact, and the 
Order entered by the District Court is not specific as to reasons 
or facts relied upon for the summary judgment. Although various 
arguments and facts were suggested in the Memorandums in Support 
and Opposition to Summary Judgment, and in the pleadings, it is 
unknown which, if any were relied on by the lower court. Without 
such information, to speculate or to list every potential item 
mentioned in the record as a possibility would unduly burden this 
Brief. Appellant believes that the specific common denominator 
running through all possible issues is the question of whether 
the Respondent was entitled to notice of taxes due and, if so, 
whether it received adequate notice of taxes due on the subject 
property and the subsequent tax sale of the property, or if it 
was entitled, as it suggests, to more specific notice. If the 
notice to the Respondent was adequate, as Appellant urges, under 
the statutes and precedents cited hereafter, the summary judgment 
should be reversed and the Appellant restored to her record title 
of the subject property as a matter of law. 
V. 
D E T E R M I N A T I V E R U L E ; R U L E 5 6 c 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
ihe portion of thn F< •- •* ,1; hi t I i i i dppnril ii n. 
(c) r ' [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the p] eadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is enti tied 
to judgment as a matter of law "' 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE SIA:UTES 
Utdh Code iUiii, ill -J 1-22 (1953) as ^mended 
Utah Code Ann, §59-2-303 (1953) as amended 
n t i i h Pnilp \MM , v i " i i II ! i i iiiei ided 
Utah Code Ann, §59-2-1317 (1953) as amended 
N'cte: The entire text of each of these statutes is reproduced as 
x " h 1 1 1 i I in i in /»| I ( H " i n I i } B . 
V 1 1 • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS 
1. This case involves uie c -
Land in Summit County known *e Lot
 J/ >ta^ecoach Esta 
more particularly described K Summit county's Plat r *^.-
Co] cimencing a t a p^xi^ nui, ch 139 . xet^ aiiu wesc 
4357.86 feet of the S.E. corner of Se; * .on 32, Township 
1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence '-^^h A^ ieqrrcr> * ** ' A- " • *2 56.?s 
feet; thence South 40 degrees 3 0 ft. East 384.71 feet; 
thence North 44 degrees 00 ft. East 12 02.27 feet; 
thence North 31 degrees 51 ft. West 372.25 feet to 
beginning. 
(Complaint, R. 2-3). 
2. On or about November 30, 1978, M. Vaughn Bitner 
("Bitner'1 Co-Defendant in lower court proceeding), owner of the 
subject property quit-claimed his interest to Barry Lynn 
Burkinshaw ("Burkinshaw" - Co-defendant in lower court 
proceeding). (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [hereinafter 
referred to as Plaintiff's Memo.], Exhibit D, R. 211). 
3. Respondent FDC entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (hereinafter referred to as UREC) to purchase said 
property from Burkinshaw on September 13, 1979. (Complaint, 
Exhibit A, R. 10). 
4. FDC recorded a "Notice of Contract" with the Summit 
County Recorder's office. (Complaint, Exhibit B, R. 12). 
5. Property taxes had been assessed on the property as 
early as 1978 and had been paid. At the time of closing on the 
contract between Burkinshaw and FDC, the taxes on the property 
were prorated. (Complaint, Exhibit B, R. 11, See #12). 
6. In the UREC FDC agreed to pay any future tax 
assessments. (Complaint, Exhibit B, R. 10, See #11). 
7. In the title insurance policy issued to Burkinshaw and 
FDC by Granite Title Company, a notation was made that the 1978 
taxes had been paid and the 1979 taxes had been assessed on the 
property and appeared as a lien, but were not yet due. (Exhibit 
A a t t - . T . . - . : - • 
8 . Taxes f o r 
no t i r._ -
in the i-ropcii . t 
Exhibit _, 
9 . I 
firough 1983 we re n e v e r p a i d . Tax 
- f,i r p «t* 
:he taxes. ? laintifff s Me me . 
u n e d Sumi" J t '„ ' u j i i l y ' . > > r>« p j i. e 
about the property taxes but were told that the ti tie work on the 
propertv had not yet been completed and therefore FDC was it u i)t 
liable :or payment ^1~ tl i a taxes• Summ.it Conn: lenied this. 
(Complaint . -. 3; .^L dint if f' s Memo., Exhibit C, R 
10 • The property was pi irehased t y Summ 
preliminary tax sale for non-payment : general -axe.- * 
(Plaintiff's Memo , Exh ib:4- • ^ , 2 1 0 ) . 
11. Nc • tic: .e of the fii tal sal e • :: f the property for delinquent 
taxes was placed in the newspaper (Summit County Bee) as required 
by statute (Plaintiff1s Memc Ex 
12 Notice of the f i nal tax bene wa^ mailer, certified, to 
the owner of record, 1 1 Vaughn Bitner. (Plaintiff's Memo. , 
Exhib.if, r i :i 8 ; 2 :):i : s •) . 
13. The property was subsequent! y so] d at the tax sale on 
May 24, 19 8 4 Bitner purchased the property **: * -<* tax sal •=* ana 
reeei1 red a Tax: Dee (I:: ] a i nt :i ff" s 
] 4, On or about October 29, 19b«
 s 3itner quit-claimed his 
interest to Appellant Miles. She rec~~i£.i :?r deed M-
, . oerty taxes from 198 i through 1981:: ; ,eiiance .. • er .-^ -n 
title, she placed a dwelling * un the property and has made _trier 
improvements and has been in quiet use and enjoyment of the 
property since 1984, (Complaint, R. 4; Defendant Miles Answer, 
R. 33) . 
15. FDC claimed that they were entitled to receive notice 
of the tax assessments and tax sale, and because they did not 
receive notice, that the tax sale was void. (Complaint, R. 4). 
16. Summit County has indicated that the property 
description in the "Notice of Contract" was "insufficient to 
describe any parcel of property whatsoever." (Plaintiff's Memo., 
Exhibit C, R. 185) . 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant contends that Plaintiff was not entitled to notice 
of the assessment of taxes or of the final tax sale. Plaintiff's 
filing of a "Notice of Contract" alone was insufficient to 
require Summit County to include it as a "claimant of record" for 
assessment purposes. Having not filed a request for notice with 
the county assessor as required by law, Plaintiff was not 
entitled to notice of the assessment of taxes or of the final tax 
sale. 
It is further the Appellant's position that FDC had many 
notices that taxes had been assessed on the property and were due 
and payable. The taxes were prorated at the time of closing. 
The title insurance policy from Granite Title Company indicated 
that the 1978 taxes had been paid, and the 1979 taxes were 
assessed. In the UREC, FDC agreed to be responsible for payment 
of any future taxes on the property. Plaintiff made no tender of 
any taxes nor any request for tax notices to be sent to it. They 
purchased the property from Burkinshaw in September of 1979. They 
paid no taxes and took no action on this property until this suit 
was initiated on April 11, 1988, some seven years and eight 
months after the property was purchased. 
The notice to FDC that taxes had been assessed on the 
property, and the notice published in the newspaper that the 
property was to be sold for delinquent taxes was all of the 
notice that FDC was entitled to under the circumstances. Simply 
recording the "Notice of Contract" with the Summit County 
Recorderfs office did not entitle FDC to personal notification or 
notice by mail of yearly tax assessments or the final tax sale. 
Had FDC wanted notice of the assessment of taxes and final tax 
sale, it would merely have had to make such a request of the 
county assessor as provided by law. Because notice to FDC was 
adequate, and the final tax sale was held in compliance with Utah 
statutes, the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to 
FDC and in declaring the final tax sale and subsequent conveyance 
to Appellant void. The lower court erred in quieting title to 
the property in FDC. 
Finally, sufficient issues of material fact existed 
pertaining to FDC's status as a claimant in the property and 
required notice which would preclude summary judgment. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
UTAH STATUTES GOVERNING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR 
TO A TAX SALE. 
(Because this case stems from the collection of taxes 
imposed from 1979 - 1984, and the property was deeded to Summit 
County and subsequently sold for delinquent taxes in 1984, the 
applicable statutes contained in Utah Code Ann. §17-21-6 through 
§17-21-22 and §59-2-301 through §59-2-1351 have been slightly 
revised. The revisions are minor, however, and are mostly 
changes in the statute numbering. The applicable statutes have 
not changed in substance during this time. Any numbering changes 
will be noted in the argument. Citations to the statutes will be 
to the most recent version.) 
FDC recorded a "Notice of Contract" with the Summit County 
Recorder when it purchased the subject property from Burkinshaw 
pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract (UREC) in September, 
1979. (R. 12). FDC contends that because of this, they should 
have received personal notice or notice by mail of the yearly tax 
assessments and the subsequent final tax sale. The "Notice of 
Contract" was indeed a recordable document and was duly recorded 
by the County Recorder. However, the County Recorder is not 
required to notify the County Assessor or Treasurer of all 
persons who have a recorded interest in a piece of property. 
In Utah, the Recorder's duties are set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. §17-21-6 through §17-21-22 (1953) as amended. These 
sections have not been substantively changed since 1979. The 
Recorder is to keep indexes of all recorded documents, 
encumbrances, conveyances, deeds and mortgages and an index to 
recorded maps, plats and subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. §17-21-22 
(1953) as amended provides in pertinent part 
[t]he county recorder shall each year prepare copies of 
said ownership maps and plats and descriptions, showing 
record owners at noon on January 1, and shall, on or 
before January 15 of each year, transmit the copies to 
the county assessor, but all changes in recorded owner-
ship of real property . . . shall be reported by the 
county recorder to the county assessor .... " 
(Emphasis added). The County Recorder delivers the plat books to 
the assessor for the tax assessments to be made. The record 
owner referred to in the statute is the person who holds legal 
title to the property. Because the seller in an installment land 
contract typically retains the legal title to the property until 
all payments have been made, the seller's name remains on the 
plat books as the record owner of the property, and the yearly 
assessments continue to be mailed to him. It is only after all 
of the installment payments have been made on a land contract 
that the title to the property is transferred to the buyer. See 
generally, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, §3.26 
(2nd ed. 1985). 
The County Assessor's duties are set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
Title 59. The substance of these sections has not changed since 
1979. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-303 (1953) as amended (formerly §59-
5-4) provides in pertinent part 
(1) Prior to May 22 each year, the county assessor 
shall ascertain the names of the owners of all property 
which is subject to taxation by the county and shall 
assess the property to the owner, claimant of record, 
or occupant in possession or control ... No mistake 
in the name or address of the owner or supposed owner 
of property renders the assessment invalid. 
Persons who are not the record owners (title holders), yet 
wish to be assessed for taxes or have the tax assessments sent to 
them may make a request to the assessor that they be listed as 
"claimant to receive notice." Utah Code Ann. §59-2-310 (1953) as 
amended (formerly §59-5-18) provides that "[r]eal property 
described on the assessment book need not be described a second 
time, but any person claiming the real property and a desire to 
be assessed for the land may have the person's name inserted with 
that of the person to whom the real property is assessed." Thus, 
tax assessment notices and notice of final tax sale will also be 
sent to such claimants as well as the title holder. 
Respondent FDC should have made a request to the Assessor to 
be listed as the a claimant on the subject property if it wanted 
to receive notice of the tax assessments. Simply recording a 
"Notice of Contract" in the Recorder's office will not accomplish 
this. The Assessor is entitled to rely on the list of record 
owners (title holders) as supplied to him by the Recorder. Since 
the Recorder only makes a change on the plat books when there is 
a change in the title holder, this would not occur in a UREC 
where a seller retains possession of the legal title. Utah Code 
Ann. §17-21-22 (1953) as amended. 
Once the assessment roll has been completed, it is 
transferred by the Assessor to the County Treasurer for the 
collection of taxes. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1317 (1953) as 
amended (formerly §59-2-1309 in 1987 and §59-10-10 in 1979) 
provides in pertinent part 
(1) Upon receipt of the assessment roll, the county 
treasurer shall index the names of all property owners 
shown by the assessment roll .... 
(2) The treasurer shall proceed to collect the taxes 
and furnish to each taxpayer ... by mail, postage 
prepaid, or leave at the taxpayer's residence or usual 
place of business, if known, a notice containing the 
(a) kind and valuation of property assessed to the 
taxpayer ... 
(3) If the property has been preliminarily sold for a 
prior tax within a period of four years and has not 
been redeemed, the treasurer shall stamp on the notice 
"Prior taxes are delinquent on this parcel. Final tax 
sale pending."... 
Consequently, the only person who receives the notice of tax 
assessment is the person whose name is listed on the Assessor's 
rolls as the owner or taxpayer. This person is generally the 
holder of the legal title. See generally, 72 Am. Jur. 2d State 
And Local Taxation §739 (1974). Unless the buyer in a land 
contract notifies the assessor to include its name along with the 
record title holder, its name is not on the assessment roll and 
it will not get notice of the tax assessments or notice of final 
tax sale mailed to it. In Fivas v. Petersen, 300 P.2d 635 (Utah 
1956) , this court indicated that the Assessor need look no 
further than the information given to him by the County Recorder 
unless there is no address listed for the record owner of the 
property. If no address is listed, the Assessor must examine the 
county records to ascertain such address. Id. at 635. 
In the case at bar, there was a record owner and address 
listed for the property. The Summit County Assessor did not have 
to look any further. Tax notices on the property were mailed to 
the owner of record. (R. 197-200). All requirements imposed by 
law were met. FDC has no one to blame but itself for failing to 
pay the taxes assessed and failing to request notice of the taxes 
from the Assessor. 
Once the notice has been given as required by statute, and 
the sale has been held, the tax title is a new and paramount 
title which totally destroys the prior title. 
When the period of redemption has expired and the 
county has received a tax deed for any real estate sold 
for delinquent taxes, the county tax lien merges into 
the title as effectively as by execution sale with such 
further rights of redemption as the statute provides. 
Purchasers from the county then take with a new and 
complete title in the land, under an independent grant 
from the sovereign authority, which bars or 
extinguishes all prior titles and encumbrances of 
private persons and all equities arising out of them. 
Hansen v. Burris, 46 P. 2d 400 (Utah 1935). The obvious reason 
for such strong language with regard to tax deeds is to ensure 
finality and stability in tax titles. It would be difficult to 
sell property at tax sales if such sales could be attacked for 
minimal reasons. The payment of taxes is absolutely essential to 
the maintenance of government. The Respondent's failure to pay 
taxes for over four years prior to the preliminary tax sale and 
for over four years subsequent to the sale does violence to the 
collection of taxes and finality of tax sales. In Utah, there is 
a four year period of redemption allowed to delinquent property 
taxpayers. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1343 (1953) as amended. If four 
years have passed without taxes being paid, it is in the best 
interest of the State and County to sell the property and to 
collect the tax due. 
B. THE NOTICE TO FDC WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE AND 
THEREFORE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
TAX SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS VOID. 
At the time FDC purchased the property they had notice that 
taxes had been assessed on the property, and would continue to be 
assessed. FDC purchased the property on September 13, 1979. The 
1978 taxes had been assessed and paid by Bitner. At the time of 
the closing on the contract between Burkinshaw and FDC, the 1979 
taxes on the property were prorated. (R. 11, See #12) . In the 
UREC, FDC agreed to pay any future tax assessments. (R. 10, See 
#11) . FDC had additional notice that taxes had been assessed in 
the title insurance policy issued to it by Granite Title Company 
in which a notation was made that the 1978 taxes had been paid, 
and that the 1979 taxes had been assessed on the property and 
appeared as a lien but were not yet due. (See Exhibit "A11 
attached hereto). FDC was fully aware that taxes would be due 
each year on the property and was not entitled to any further 
written notice of the annual assessment unless requested as 
outlined in the previous section. 
Prior to the tax sale of the subject property, notice of the 
final tax sale, including a list of the property to be sold, was 
published in the Summit County Bee, (newspaper circulated in 
Summit County.) (R. 218). Furthermore, the owner of record, as 
required by law, was given notice of the sale by certified mail. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1351 (1953) as amended. (R. 187, 201-209). 
No further notice is required. Once the property was sold to the 
County by operation of law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-2-13 3 6 
(1953) as amended, each tax notice for the subsequent years 
stated that the property had been sold and was subject to a final 
sale. (See R. 197-199). Had FDC properly requested notice from 
the Assessor by filing as a claimant as provided, FDC would have 
had ample opportunity to pay the taxes and protect its interest. 
Because FDC received several notices that taxes had been 
assessed on the property at the time of their purchase, and FDC, 
was responsible for paying the taxes and could have protected its 
interest by requesting notice from the Assessor, and Summit 
County published notice of the final tax sale in the newspaper, 
FDC was not denied its constitutional due process rights. The 
notices were constitutionally adequate, and therefore the tax 
sale was proper. The lower court order declaring the tax sale 
void should be overturned and the property restored to Appellant. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue of notice in 
two due process cases; Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 3 39 
U.S. 306 (1950) and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 
U.S. 791 (1983). In Mullane, the issue concerned the sufficiency 
of notice to beneficiaries of a trust fund established under New 
York banking law. Notice of a judicial settlement of accounts 
was published in a local newspaper. 339 U.S. at 309-10. 
Although Central Hanover had addresses for some of the 
beneficiaries, no mailed notices were sent. 
The Court was concerned about notice to the beneficiaries, 
both residents and non-residents, who would not have previous 
knowledge of such proceedings. Such persons would therefore, not 
be on the alert to watch for a newspaper notice in New York. The 
Court said that mailed notice was required to all persons whose 
names and addresses were reasonably ascertainable. Id. at 318-
19. 
Because the property rights in Mullane were intangible, 
personal notification or mailed notice was important. On a case 
such as the one at bar, with a real property interest, owners 
tend to make themselves aware of any attack on their ownership 
rights. Id. at 316. Property owners understand that taxes are 
assessed and due annually, and failure to pay them results in 
forfeiture of the property. 
In Mennonite, a mortgage bank was not notified when the 
owner of a piece of property (on whicfc they had a security 
interest) failed to pay the taxes on the property. The property 
was subsequently sold for taxes. 462 U.S. at 794-95. The Court 
held that the bank should have received mailed notice. Id. at 
800. 
Indeed, when one holds a property interest such as the 
mortgagee in Mennonite, it makes good sense to insure that they 
receive adequate notice of actions affecting their property 
interest. The mortgagee in Mennonite, was at the mercy of the 
property owner to pay the taxes on the property. If unpaid, the 
mortgagee would not be aware of any arrearages or tax sales 
without personal or mailed notice. 
In Mennonite, the mortgagee was not required to pay the 
taxes, the owner was. Therefore, the mortgagee was not aware if 
taxes had been paid. In fact, the owner continued to make his 
mortgage payments to the mortgagee even after the sale, leaving 
the mortgagee with a false sense of security. Because of this, 
the mortgagee was entitled to mailed notice. 
In the current matter, FDC was the party responsible for 
payment of taxes. They already had notice that taxes were and 
would continue to be assessed, and they were also aware of their 
obligation to pay them. If FDC had requested notice, as provided 
for by law, the Assessor would have listed FDC's name as a 
claimant to the property and it would have received mailed 
notice. It was FDC's own failure to fulfill its obligation to 
pay the taxes that resulted in the tax sale of the property, not 
the failure of any third party as in Mennonite or Mullane. 
Both Mullane and Mennonite held that notice in their 
specific cases should be sent to those persons whose name and 
addresses are reasonably ascertainable. Assuming arguendo that 
Summit County tried to mail notice to FDC, they would not have 
succeeded. Summit County indicates that the property 
descriptions listed on the "Notice of Contract" were not 
accurate, and could not be successfully matched to any property 
on the tax rolls at the time of FDC's purchase in 1979. In 
Summit County's Answer (R. 20) they indicate in their Third 
Defense that: 
Stagecoach Estates Plat C is not now, nor has it 
ever been a dedicated legal subdivision in Summit 
County, State of Utah. The legal description, 
contained on any of the Plaintiff's documents recorded 
in the Summit County Recorder's Office is legally 
insufficient to describe any piece of real property 
whatsoever, and as such is void. 
In Summit County's response to FDC's Interrogatories (R. 185) 
they indicated: 
...[T]here was no Stagecoach Estates Plat "C" on 
file in the Summit County Recorder's Office until 1987. 
Accordingly, throughout the time in question, any 
reference to Lot 5 Stagecoach Estates Plat "C" would 
have been an indefinite description. Additionally, the 
metes and bounds description contained in the Notice of 
Contract is vague and indefinite and does not close. 
As a result, reference to either description was 
insufficient to describe any parcel of property 
whatsoever. 
Because of this, mailed notice, or any personal notice from 
Summit County to FDC would have been impossible. 
C. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT, THE TAX DEED CLAIMANT, 
IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACTS. 
The sale of the subject property from Burkinshaw to FDC was 
pursuant to a UREC. "In such contracts, the vendor retains legal 
title until the final payment is made, at which time full title 
is conveyed to the vendee." G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate 
Finance Law, §3.26 (2d ed. 1985). FDC had notice in the contract 
that taxes had been assessed on the property. When they made the 
down payment and signed the contract the taxes were prorated 
accordingly. (R. 11). 
A second notice to FDC that taxes had been assessed on the 
property came in the title insurance policy issued to Plaintiff 
by Granite Title Company. In this policy, there was a notation 
that the 1978 taxes had been paid and that the 1979 taxes had 
been assessed but were not yet due. (Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto). A third notice that FDC would be responsible for taxes 
was contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the UREC. FDC agreed to 
be responsible for the payment of any future taxes. (R. 10). 
Despite all of this, FDC claims that it did not know that taxes 
had been assessed on the property. It is hard to believe that 
anyone purchasing property, no matter how foolhardy or naive, 
would not know that the property would be subject to taxation. 
FDC claimed that its President called the Summit County Assessor 
to inquire about the taxes and was told that the property had not 
been platted, and therefore the taxes on the individual lots 
could not be assessed. Summit County denied this. (R. 183). 
Whether or not FDC had adequate notice that taxes had been 
assessed on the property and that the property would be sold for 
delinquent taxes is an issue of material fact. Whether the 
property description contained in the "Notice of Contract11 was 
sufficient to describe the property so that if additional notice 
was required, Summit County could have sent it, is also an issue 
of material fact. Because these factual issues were in dispute, 
as is apparent from the pleadings on file, the lower court erred 
in granting summary judgment. Summary judgments should only be 
granted when it appears "there is no reasonable probability that 
the party moved against could prevail." Frisbee v. KNK 
Construction Co.
 r 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 56(c) indicates that "summary judgment is 
appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and 
admissions submitted in a case show there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." In the case at bar there was a dispute as 
to whether FDC had notice on the tax assessments on the property. 
There was also a dispute as to whether FDC had notice of the tax 
sale of the property, or if further notice was required, whether 
it could have been sent. These disputes were set forth in the 
pleadings and memoranda submitted to the lower court in 
consideration of the motion for summary judgment. "In 
considering a summary judgment motion, the court must evaluate 
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 
739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah App. 1987). the facts presented by 
Defendants in the pleadings, including answers to Interrogatories 
and Affidavits indicated that FDC had notice that the taxes were 
assessed and would be due, and FDC agreed to pay any further tax 
assessments on the property. FDC made no attempt to pay taxes 
nor contact Appellant Miles until 1988 when this action was 
instituted, even though Miles had been in possession of the 
property since 1984. Certainly in consideration of the dispute 
about notice, and the length of time that elapsed prior to 
bringing this action, the lower court, in granting summary 
judgment to FDC, did not look at the facts in the light most 
favorable to Defendant Miles who was opposing the motion. "On 
appeal from summary judgment, [the Supreme Court] review[s] 
evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party," Geneva 
Pipe Co. v. S. & H. Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). 
Looking at the record in the light most favorable to Appellant, 
the record clearly shows the existence of genuine issues of 
material fact. Because of this the lower court erred in granting 




From the foregoing, it is clear that FDC has failed to 
protect its property interest as provided by law and further 
failed to pay its property taxes. FDC was not entitled to any 
further notice of tax assessment or final tax sale. Furthermore, 
even if FDC was entitled to notice, the notice provided by 
publication was adequate under the circumstances. In addition, 
there were numerous disputed issues of material fact precluding 
entry of summary judgment in this matter. Consequently, the 
lower court erred in granting summary judgment against Defendant 
Miles and this Court should now reverse that judgment and remand 
this case back to the/lower Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this /^^day of April, 1990 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
TALD C. WOLTHUIS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant was mailed to Rodney G. Snow and Stephen B. 
Doxey, CLYDE PRATT & SNOW, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 200 
American Savings Pla^a, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 on this /P ^ day of April, 1990y 
O A 
Tab A 
O-2-B-1970 AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION OWNERS POUCY-^Form B—1970 (AnMiutod 10-17-70} 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
issued by 
The Title Guarantee Company 
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202 
JECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE PRO-
[ONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, THE TITLE GUARANTEE COMPANY, a Maryland 
oration, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the 
int of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay 
under, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; or 
4. Unmarketability of such title. 
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
>llowing matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy: 
Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting or 
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location of 
any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the dimen-
sions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation. 
Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in the 
public records at Date of Policy. 
Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claim-
ant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of 
Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy and not disclosed in writing by the in-
sured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured claimant became an insured hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss 
or damage to the insured claimant; (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy; or (e) resulting in loss or damage 
which would not have been sustained if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy. 
TNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this policy to be signed and sealed, to become valid when countersigned by a 
ig officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. 
GRANITE 
^5pTLE CO. 
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DATE OF POLICY: 
September 19r 1979 
POLICY INCLUDING RISK PRE-
MIUM IS $ U 1 . 0 0 
AMOUNT: 
1 8 , 5 5 0 , 0 0 
VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULES A 6c B ARE 
ATTACHED TO ALTA 1970 OWNERS POLICY 
SCHEDULE A 
NAME OF INSURED 
BARRY LYNN BURKINSHAW, 
AND FURNITURE DISTRIBUTION CENTER 
(As Their Interests May Appear) 
The estate or interest in the land described or identified herein and which is covered by this policy is: 
Fee Simple and Contract 
The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
BARRY LYNN BURKINSHAW 
The land referred to in this policy is described or identified as follows: 
Lot 5 Stagecoach Estates Plat C described as follows: Commencing at a point 
North 1392.47 feet and West 4357.86 feet of the S. E. comer of Section 32, 
Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence 
South 45°0f West 1256.38 feet; thence South 40°30f East 384.71 feet; thence 
North 44°00f East 1202.27 fet; thence North 31°53f West 372.25 feet to 
beginning. 
Situate in Summit County, State of Utah 
HI 




This policy docs not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following: 
PART I l- Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies 
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained 
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
A. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct 
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by the public records. 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water 
rights, claims or title to water. 
6. Possible unfiled mechanics' and materialmen's liens. 
7. The dower, curtesy, homestead, community property, or other statutory marital rights, if any, of the spouse of any 
individual Insured. 
PAKT II 
1. Taxes for the year 1979 accruing as a lien, not yet due. 
year 1978 were paid. (Serial No.PSS 152-8) 
Taxes for the 
2. Trust Deed, dated September 3, 1976, in the amount of $61,000.00, in favor 
of First Security Bank of Utah, as Beneficiary, and Security Title, as Trustee, 
executed by M. Vaughn Bitner and Virginia Bitner, as Trustors, recorded 
September 13, 1976, in Book M 84 Page 64 as Entry No. 133414 of official 
records. 
3. Unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated September 13, 1979, by and 
between Barry Lynn Burklnshaw, as Seller, and Furniture Distribution Center, a 
Utah corporation, as Buyer, creating the contract interest hereby insured. 
4. Notice of Contract, dated September 13, 1979, shown as Item 3 above, 
recorded September 18, 1979 in book M-141 Page 422 as Entry No. 159462 in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
5. Subject to and together with a Right of Way 100 feet wide across the 
property of Seller in Sections 29, 30, 31 and 32, Township 1 North, Range 4 
East, Sections 5, 6, 8, 17 and 20, Township 1 South Range 4 East to provide 
ingress and egress to Buyer's property. 
6. Subject to a 50 foot Right of Way to allow ingress and egress of other 
property owners and also said Lot is subject to a perpetual easement for 
building, constructing and maintaining public or private utilities. 
7. All Rights of Way are to be jointly maintained with other property 
owners. 
CONTINUED 
signed: GRANITE TITLE CO. 
SCHEDULE B CONTINUED 
8. Excluded from the real property transferred herewith are any and all 
mineral rights whether surface or subsurface. 
9. Seller expressly reserves any and all water rights, diligence rights for 
water, whether surface or sub-surface, previously used by seller which may be 
on or cross buyer's property. 
10. Subject to and together with all Rights of Way necessary for access and as 
recorded or provided in respect to any of Stagecoach Estates. 
11. Subject to a 5 foot utility easement along the 384.71 foot course and the 
1256.38 foot course. 
12. Subject to a 50 foot Right of Way for roads along the following courses: 
North 31°53f West 372.25 feet. 
13. Subject to and together with all rights of the Protective Covenants 
recorded on Plat a Stagecoach Estates as Document # 111622 recorded August 21, 
1970, Book M 27, Page 497, as fully as if said Protective Covenants were 
recorded in respect to this property and with all rights relating thereto. 
14. Subject to any possible boundary conflicts or encroachments revealed by a 
survey or plat. 
15. Any assessments which may hereafter accrue in favor of Greenbelt 
Assessments or any special assessments levied by the Weber Water Conservancy 
District, Park City Fire Protection District, Snyderville Basin Sewer 
Improvement District or the Summit County Special District No. 7. 

CONDITIONS AND STD7ULATI0NS 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms when used in this policy mean 
(a) insured the insured named in Schedule A, and, subject to anv 
gnts or defenses the Company may have had against the named insured, 
ose who succeed to the interest of such insured by operation of law as 
stin*utshed from purchase including, but not limited to, heirs, distnbu 
!*. devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of kin, or corporate 
fiduciary successors. 
(b) "insured claimant *. an insured claiming loss or damage here-
ider. 
(c) "knowledge* actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or 
rtice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public 
cotds 
(d) "land"* the land described, specifically or by reference in Schcd-
e A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real 
operty, provided, however, the term land' does not include any prop-
ty beyond the lines of the area specifically described or referred to in 
hedule A, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting 
-cctst roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein 
all modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to and from the 
id is insured by this policy 
(e) "mortgage', mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other security 
rtrument 
(f) "public records' those records which by law impart construc-
e notice of matters relating to said land 
Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title 
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy 
favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an estate or 
erest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase money 
>rtgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such 
>ured shall have liability by reason of covenants of warranty made by 
~h insured in any transfer or conveyance of such estate or interest, pro-
led, however, this policy shall not continue in force in favor of any 
rchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the in-
btedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured 
Defense and Prosecution of Action*—Notice of Claim to be given 
by an Injured Claimant 
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall 
wide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of actions 
proceedings commenced against such insured, or a defense interposed 
unst an insured in an action to enforce a contract for a sale of the 
ate or interest in said land, to the extent that such litigation is founded 
on an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other matter insured against 
this policy 
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (1) in 
e any action or proceeding is begun or defense is interposed as set 
th in (a) above, (11) in case knowledge shall come to an insured 
eundcr of any claim of title or interest which is adverse to the title 
the estate or interest as insured, and which might cause loss or damage 
which the Company may be liable by virtue of this policy, or ( in) if 
e to the estate or interest, as insured, is rejected as unmarketable If such 
>mpt notice shall not be given to the Company, then as to such insured 
liability of the Company shall cease and terminate in regard to the 
ttcr or matters for which such prompt notice is required provided, 
vever that failure to notify shall in no case prejudice the rights of any 
h insured under this policy unless the Company shall be prejudiced by 
h failure and then only to the extent of such prejudice 
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and 
hout undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any 
er act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish 
title to the estate or interest as insured and the Company may take 
appropriate action under the terms of this policy whether or not it 
I I L I L I l l J i n i L 1 • 1 i 
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or inter 
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy, 
the Company may pursue any such litigation to final determination by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in its 
sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order 
(e) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company to 
prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, the 
insured hereunder shall secure to the Company the right to so prosecute 
or provide defense in such action or proceeding, and all appeals therein, 
and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of such insured 
for such purpose Whenever requested by the Company, such insured shall 
give the Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, in 
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or prosecuting 
or defending such action or proceeding, and the Company shall reimburse 
such insured for any expense so incurred 
4. Notice of Loea—Limitation of Action 
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these 
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or damage 
for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall bt 
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such loss or damage shall 
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insured 
claimant until 30 days after such statement shall have been furnished 
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate any 
liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or damage 
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle for or in 
the name or an insured claimant any daim insured against or to terminate 
all liability and obligations of the Company hereunder by paying or 
tendering payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together 
with any costs, attorneys fees and expenses incurred up to the time of 
such payment or tender of payment, by the insured claimant and 
authorized by the Company 
6. Determination and Payment of Loea 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no case 
exceed the least of 
( I ) the actual loss of the insured claimant, or 
(u ) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A 
(b) The Company will pay, in addition to any loss insured against by 
this policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation earned on by 
the Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys fees and expenses 
in litigation earned on by such insured with the written authorization of 
the Company 
(c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with the 
conditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable within 30 
days thereafter 
7. Limitation of Liability 
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this oolicj (a) if the 
Company, after having received notice of an alleged detect, lien or 
encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise, re 
moves such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title as insured, 
within a reasonable time after receipt of such notice (b) in the event of 
litigation until there has been a final determination by a court of com 
petent jurisdiction, and disposition of all appeals therefrom adverse to 
the title as insured as provided in paragraph 3 hereof, or (c) for liability 
voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit without 
prior written consent of the Company 
8. Reduction of Liability 
All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs 
attorneys fees and expenses shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro 
tanto No payment shall be made without producing this policy for en 
dorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in 
ln«« r\r A*<trurftnn <hal! he furnished to the 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—Continued 
9. liability Noncumularive 
It is expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this 
policy shall be reduced by any amount the Company may pay under any 
policy insuring either (a) a mortgage shown or referred to in Schedule B 
hereof which is a lien on the estate or interest covered by this policy, or 
(b) a mortgage hereafter executed by an insured which is a charge or 
lien on the estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and 
the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy. The 
Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such 
mortgages any amount that otherwise would be payable hereunder to the 
insured owner of the estate or interest covered by this policy and the 
amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy to said 
insured owner. 
10. Apportionment 
If the land described in Schedule A consists of two or more parcels 
which are not used as a single site, and a loss is established aflecting one 
or more of said parcels but not all, the loss shall be computed and settled 
on a pro rata basis as if the amount of insurance under this policy was 
divided pro rata as to the value on Date of Policy of each separate parcel 
to the whole, exclusive of any improvements made subsequent to Date of 
Policy, unless a liability or value has otherwise been agreed upon as to 
each such parcel by the Company and the insured at the time of the 
issuance of this policy and shown by an express statement herein or by 
an endorsement attached hereto. 
11. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this policy, all 
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of 
the insured claimant. The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled 
to all rights and remedies which such insured claimant would have had 
against any person or property in respect to such claim had this policy not 
been issued, and if requested by the Company, such insured clai 
transfer to the Company ail rights and remedies against any 
property necessary in order to perfect such right of subrogatioc 
permit the Company to use the name of such insured claims 
transaction or litigation involving such rights or remedies. If th 
does not cover the loss of such insured claimant, the Com pan 
subrogated to such rights and remedies in the proportion v 
payment bears to the amount of said loss. If loss should result 
act of such insured claimant, such act shall not void this polic 
Company, in that event, shall be required to pty only that pi 
losses insured against hereunder which shall exceed the amour; 
lost to the Company by reason of the impairment of the 
subrogation. 
12. Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other ins 
if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and 
between the insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligt 
which arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest 
hereby or any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to 
visions and conditions and stipulations of this policy. 
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made e 
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signea by either the P 
a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validatin 
or authorized signatory of the Company. 
13. Notices, Where Sent 
All notices required to be given the Company and any statei 
writing required to be furnished the Company shall be addre 
it at its Home Omce, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. 
This Policy is not transferable to a subsequent purchaser but should be retained by Insured for his protection aj 
future loss under warranties or covenants of title. A Reissue Policy in favor of new purchaser should be obta 
£ 3 - : - « t J » •:•!•:- >: i:->xacmf .:. 
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17-21-22. Annual revision — Reporting changes in owner-
ship to county assessors — Costs, how borne. 
The county recorder shall, each year, prepare copies of ownership maps and 
plats and descriptions, showing record owners at r)oon on Janua ry 1, and 
shall, on or before January 15 of each year t ransmit the copies to the county 
assessor, but all changes in recorded ownership of real property made during 
the first seven months of each calendar year shall be reported by the county 
recorder to the county assessor not later than August 15 of that year and for 
the remainder of the calendar year the changes in the ownership of real 
property which are filed in the county recorder's office shall be reported each 
month by the county recorder to the county assessor on or before the 15th day 
of the month following the month in which the changes were recorded in the 
office of the county recorder. These changes of ownership shall be transmitted 
by the recorder's office to the assessor's office on appropriate forms furnished 
by the recorder's office showing the current owner's name and a full legal 
description of the property conveyed. In those cases where only a part of the 
grantor's property is currently conveyed the recorder shall t ransmit an addi-
tional form showing a full legal description of the portion retained. The cost of 
making copies of maps and plats and descriptions fcjr use of the assessor as 
provided in this section shall be paid one-half by the dtate and one-half by the 
county; but in any county having a taxable value for4 the current tax year of 
less than $50,000,000, plats for the year may not exceed Y/< of the state, state 
school, and state high school taxes levied in the county for the year; and in 
any county having a taxable value of $50,000,000 or jnore for the current tax 
year the state's portion of the cost of making and revising maps and plats may 
not exceed V2of 1% of the total state, state school, and state high school taxes 
levied in the county for the year. 
59-2-303- General duties of county assessor. 
(1) Prior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall ascertain the 
names of the owners of all property which is subject to taxation by the county, 
and shall assess the property to the owner, claimant of record, or occupant in 
possession or control at 12 o'clock m. of January 1 ip the tax year, unless a 
subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real property was recorded in the 
office of the county recorder more than 14 calendar days before the date of 
mailing of the tax notice. In tha t case, any tax notice may be mailed, and the 
tax assessed, to the new owner. No mistake in the name or address of the 
owner or supposed owner of property renders the Assessment invalid. 
(2) Assessors shall become fully acquainted with kl\ property in their re-
spective counties, and, either in person or by deputy, regularly update assess-
ment records in order to annually establish the values of the property they are 
required to assess. 
59-2-310- Assessment in name of claimant as well as 
owner. 
Real property described on the assessment book need not be described a 
second time, but any person claiming the real property and a desire to be 
assessed for the land may have the person's name inserted with tha t of the 
person to whom the real property is assessed. 
59-2-1317. Index of property owners — Tax notice. 
(1) Upon receipt of the assessment roll, the county t reasurer shall index the 
names of all property owners shown by the assessment roll. The commission 
shall prescribe a form of index which shall be uniform in all the counties 
throughout the state. 
(2) The treasurer shall proceed to collect the taxes and furnish to each 
taxpayer, except those taxpayers under Sections 59-2-1302 and 59-2-1307, by 
mail, postage prepaid, or leave at the taxpayer's residence or usual place of 
business, if known, a notice containing: (a) the kind and value of property 
assessed to the taxpayer; (b) the street address of the property, where applica-
ble; (c) the amount of tax levied: and (d) if no notice has been provided under 
Section 59-2-919, the days fixed by the county board of equalization for hear-
ing complaints. The notice shall set out the aggregate amount of taxes to be 
paid for state, county, city, town, school, and other purposes. 
(3) If the property has been preliminarily sold for a prior tax within a 
period of four years and has not been redeemed, the treasurer shall s tamp on 
the notice 'Trior taxes are delinquent on this parcel. Final tax sale pending." 
The notice shall set out separately all taxes levied only on a certain kind or 
class of property for a special purpose or purposes, and shall have printed or 
stamped on it the effective rate of taxation for each purpose for which taxes 
have been levied, when and wrhere payable, the date the taxes will be delin-
quent, and the penalty provided by law. 
(4) The notice shall be mailed at least ten days before the first day the 
county board of equalization meets to hear complaints if no increase in the 
certified tax rate is proposed, or by November 1 if an increase in the certified 
tax rate is proposed under the procedures established in Section 59-2-919. The 
notice shall be in duplicate form and the county treasurer need not mail out a 
tax receipt acknowledging payment 
(5) After notices have been mailed, the county treasurer shall make avail-
able the assessment roll, map books, and statements to the clerk of the county 
board of equalization. 
